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Abstract. In this demo we present the Trusted Tiny Things system that
can be used to interrogate Internet of Things (IoT) devices and present
users with information about their characteristics and capabilities. The
system consists of a mobile application used to retrieve information about
IoT devices supported by RESTful web services. In order to infer IoT
device capabilities our services perform reasoning over the provenance of
devices characterised using an extension of the PROV-O ontology. In this
demo we illustrate the use of the system with two distinct IoT devices:
an NFC tag used at bus stops to provide a means to access real-time bus
timetables, and a blackbox device installed into vehicles by insurance
companies to track driving behaviour.
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1 Introduction
The Trusted Tiny Things project1 is exploring how semantic technologies can
make Internet of Things (IoT) devices more transparent to users. IoT devices
now routinely gather, analyse and manipulate data from their surroundings;
they are also capable of exchanging such data with other devices and services
by means of M2M (Machine to Machine) communications. The need for trans-
parency in the IoT domain is seen as crucial in order to ensure the legitimacy
of activities performed by devices, but also to increase security and privacy [1].
Certain operations associated with IoT devices may be deemed undesirable by
users (e.g. third-party data sharing, consumption of personal data), and there-
fore users should be made aware of such capabilities. In this paper we argue
that by publishing information about IoT devices such as manufacturer, owner,
device type) according to the linked data principles [2] and by capturing their
provenance (e.g. services, owners, organisations, etc.), it is possible to make ca-
pabilities of IoT devices more transparent.
We are investigating these issues via two user scenarios. The first of these ex-
plores the use of NFC tags attached to timetables at bus stops in Aberdeenshire,
UK. A user with an NFC enabled phone can scan such tags to access a real-time
1 This research is supported by the UK Research Councils’ Digital Economy IT
as a Utility Network+ (EP/K003569/1) and the dot.rural Digital Economy Hub
(EP/G066051/1).
2bus timetable via the phone’s web browser. Users may expect that the service
is operated by Aberdeenshire Council, but in fact it is run by an external IT
solutions provider. As part of offering the service, this third party organisation
collects data from the smartphone (e.g. IP address, type of smartphone device).
Our second user scenario investigates the use of in-car blackboxes, which are
being installed into vehicles by insurance companies. These devices are used to
track driver’s behaviour in order to tailor insurance premiums to individuals.
The devices continuously collect data (e.g. GPS location, acceleration, driving
patterns, etc.) and connect to a third party service that collects the data on
behalf of the insurance company. In this scenario the service could change over
time. For example, a new organisation (e.g. a car manufacturer analysing engine
management data) could be allowed to use the data generated by the sensors.
2 Semantic Framework
In order to inform the design of a semantic framework for IoT devices we have
conducted three participatory design events involving a total of 14 participants
with different technological backgrounds. Participants were asked to discuss is-
sues surrounding the capabilities of IoT devices. Questions were posed such as:
What do you think are the capabilities of this device? and What kind of capabil-
ities would you want to be aware of before interacting with this kind of device?.
We have developed an OWL ontology2 (illustrated in Figure 1) to link physi-
cal entities (iota:PhysicalEntity) with their IoT components (iota:Device3) using
concepts derived from a model created as part of the Internet of Things Archi-
tecture (IoTa) project4. This allows us to identify those IoT devices and their
virtual representations (iota:VirtualEn-
tity) so we can analyse their characteristics and capabilities. The PROV-O [3]
ontology is used as an upper ontology and allows us to characterise entities
(data), activities (device processes and operations) and agents (either software
or physical) associated with IoT devices and supporting services. For example,
we can associate a particular device activity (e.g. location sensing) to the agent
that initiated the operation (e.g. insurance company). Using PROV-O allows
queries to be formulated such as: Who initiated the action? What entities have
been used? When was a particular action executed? However, PROV-O on its
own cannot answer questions such as: Why and for what purpose were the data
used? Is the data confidential?
Guided by user requirements we have designed an ontology to support in-
ferences about device capabilities using provenance described according to the
PROV-O and IoTa ontology. We created a lightweight ontological model called
T35 that provides annotations over provenance records. Using this model, we
2 http://t3.abdn.ac.uk/ontologies/iota.owl
3 An artefact that provides an interface between the digital world and the physical
world.
4 http://www.iot-a.eu
5 http://t3.abdn.ac.uk/ontologies/t3.owl
3Fig. 1. An extract of the iota ontology representing relationships between a virtual
entities and a physical entities in the Internet of Things
are able to annotate the qualified usage class (prov:Usage) with ttt:purpose to
describe why a particular entity (data) is used by a specific activity.
When managing provenance of IoT devices it is not always possible to in-
strument devices and services to generate information about their usage and
operation (retrospective provenance). In some cases, manufacturers can provide
information on how devices are intended to operate (prospective provenance). In
our framework we therefore make provision for both kinds of provenance. Our
framework is also capable of distinguishing between direct capabilities (activities
performed onboard the device) and indirect capabilities (activities performed by
associated devices or services).
In order to infer the capabilities of IoT devices using our ontological frame-
work we can associate rules to specific classes of ttt:Capability. We make use of
the SPIN ontology6 to support the use of SPARQL to specify rules and logi-
cal constraints necessary to reason about capabilities. The SPIN ontology allows
SPARQL queries to be represented in RDF and associated to classes in an ontol-
ogy using a pre-defined spin:rule property that can be used to specify inference
rules using SPARQL CONSTRUCT, DELETE and INSERT statements. Figure
2 (top box) shows an example of such a rule for the ttt:DataConsumption class.
The rule is designed to traverse a PROV-O provenance graph starting from an
instance of an iota:Device and to identify activities that have used or generated
entities classified as personal data. Once such activities have been identified
the rule specifies how an annotation about the data consumption capability is
generated, including a link to the agent responsible for the activity and the spe-
cific purpose. In this ontology we have also specified two rules that are used to
determine what provenance has been used to infer a specific device capability.
These rules make use of the ttt:Follows qualified relationship to distinguish be-
tween prospective and retrospective provenance and are illustrated in Figure 2
(bottom left and bottom right boxes).
6 http://spinrdf.org/spin.html
4CONSTRUCT {
    ?device :prospectiveCapability ?capability .
}
WHERE {
    ?device prov:wasAttributedTo ?agent .
    ?agent :qualifiedFollow ?follow .
    ?follow :shouldGenerate ?bundle .
    ?device :isCapableOf ?capability .
    ?capability :consumes ?data .
    ?bundle :contains ?data .
    NOT EXISTS {
        ?device :prospectiveCapability ?capability .
    } .
}
CONSTRUCT {
    ?device :retrospectiverCapability ?capability .
}
WHERE {
    ?device prov:wasAttributedTo ?agent .
    ?bundle a prov:Bundle .
    ?bundle prov:wasAttributedTo ?agent .
    ?device :isCapableOf ?capability .
    ?capability :consumes ?data .
    ?bundle :contains ?data .
    NOT EXISTS {
        ?device :retrospectiveCapability ?capability .
    } .
}
CONSTRUCT {
    _:b0 a :DataConsumption .
    _:b0 :consumes ?data .
    _:b0 :consumer ?agent .
    _:b0 :purpose ?purposeDescription .
    ?this :isCapableOf _:b0 .
}
WHERE {
    ?virtualentity iota:represents ?this .
    ?activity (prov:qualifiedUsage)+ ?usage .
    ?usage prov:entity ?data .
    ?data a :PersonalData .
    ?usage :purpose ?purposeDescription .
    ?activity (prov:wasAssociatedWith)+/prov:actedOnBehalfOf ?agent .
    ?agent a foaf:Organization .
    NOT EXISTS {
        ?this :isCapableOf ?capability .
        ?capability :purpose ?purposeDescription .
        ?capability :consumer ?agent .
        ?capability :consumes ?data .
    } .
}
Fig. 2. Example of device capability inference rule (top box) and two rules used to
distinguish between prospective and retrospective provenance (bottom left and bottom
right boxes).
Participants during our design exercises highlighted the need to provide con-
tact information about agents (individuals or organisations) responsible for cer-
tain devices and therefore we use the FOAF7 ontology. The class foaf:Organization
is defined as a subclass of prov:Agent. Figure 3 presents a visualisation of the
device capabilities in a mobile app and the respective sample provenance graph
taken from the bus stop scenario.
3 The Trusted Tiny Things System
In order to support our semantic framework we have developed a software in-
frastructure (see Figure 4) that can be used to query, update and register IoT
devices and to notify the user of any changes in the capabilities of a particular
device. We store device data in an OpenRDF Sesame8 triplestore. Additionally,
we utilize a MySQL database server to store smartphone IDs (used to iden-
tify users) and accepted device capabilities. Our framework is composed of five
core services, which are responsible for registering devices to our system, updat-
ing and synchronizing the provenance record, providing access to information,
reasoning over the provenance record to infer capabilities, and notifying users
7 http://www.foaf-project.org/
8 http://www.openrdf.org
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Fig. 3. Smartphone app showing the capabilities of a bus stop NFC tag (left) and an
extract of the supporting provenance (right).
about changes in device provenance. In order for a user to interact with the
system, we have implemented an Android mobile application (Figure 3), that is
able to query and visualise capabilities of IoT devices registered in our system
and to notify users of changes in the provenance record. The application can be
downloaded from the Google Play Store9.
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Fig. 4. Trusted Tiny Things System Architecture
The provenance-based approach for determining the capabilities of a device
has certain advantages over similar compliance-based alternatives. In Google
Play, for example, users are presented with a list of access permissions based
9 https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=uk.ac.abdn.t3.trustedtinythings
6on the capabilities of the app being installed. These permissions are determined
only by the functionalities implemented in the app (e.g. use of the GPS sensor)
disregarding how and why information is used and by whom. However, by using
a provenance-based approach, it is possible to define capabilities in terms of how
information has been used. Moreover, the Google Play approach notifies users
of changes only when a new version of the app is pushed into the store. In our
approach, such changes are determined using the provenance record which is
independent from new versions of applications, devices or services (e.g. change
in the server infrastructure with regards to manipulation of user’s data triggers
notification to user).
4 Demonstration Content
In the demonstration we will illustrate the behaviour of the system using the two
scenarios described above. In the Bus Stop scenario we will highlight the capa-
bilities of the NFC device based on prospective provenance. A short presentation
video of this scenario can be viewed at our Trusted Tiny Things website10. In the
car blackbox scenario we will demonstrate how retrospective provenance is used
to infer the capabilities of the telemetry box. Finally, we will showcase our noti-
fication service by changing the way that the insurance service operates (it will
begin to share sensor data with car manufacturers). We will demonstrate how
our system would detect the change and infer new capabilities associated with
this change (i.e. confidential data is now shared with a third-party company).
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